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AMBIGUITIES OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 




The proliferation of private norm-making, that is, the creation of legally 
binding rules outside of the institutional, state-based systems of rule-setting, 
very forcefully accentuates the dilemma of the modern nation state’s exhaustion 
in an era of globalization. Seen against the background of the law-as-victim 
thesis, the ubiquitous forms of “private ordering,” both inside and outside of 
the nation-state, are regularly read as signs of the erosion processes, which 
allegedly characterize the general fate of the sovereign state in the global era 
and find a particularly striking illustration in the relativization of the state’s 
authority to administer and to control the institutions of norm-creation.1 
However, from a sociological perspective, the current interest of so-called 
governance theories2 in “social norms” falls squarely into the discipline’s 
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 1.  For a distinctly skeptical perspective, see Johannes Köndgen, Privatisierung des Rechts: Private 
Governance zwischen Deregulierung und Rekonstitutionalisierung, 206 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE 
PRAXIS [ACP] 477, 477–525 (2006) (Ger.). 
 2.  See generally Thomas Vesting, Die Staatsrechtslehre und die Veränderung ihres Gegenstandes: 
Konsequenzen von Europäisierung und Internationalisierung, 63 VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER 
VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 41 (2003) (Ger.); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, 
DAS UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT (1995) (presenting a comprehensive theory to 
describe the transformation of the state in the face of complex societal challenges); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, 
Die rechtswissenschaftliche Methodendiskussion und die Bewältigung des gesellschaftlichen Wandels, 64 
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ], 60, 
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concern with the study of societal differentiation processes. Such accounts play 
a crucial role in informing legal scholars’ inquiries into the nature and 
consequences of private norm-creation processes for the study of law in 
general.3 
Compressed into a relatively small space then, we can discern some of the 
central challenges to current legal thinking: under the impression of an 
unquestionably deep-running transformation of forms of public and private 
ordering, lawyers seek explanations by contextualizing these developments. 
What they find are impressive accounts of globalization processes, which have 
prompted a considerable number of social science disciplines to fundamentally 
rethink their analytical categories and conceptual frameworks. In this context, 
legal scholars find that their own accounts of the growing limits of regulatory 
capacity in view of, for example, border-crossing environmental or security 
concerns, coalesce with observations made by political scientists, sociologists, 
geographers, or anthropologists regarding a fundamental decentralization and 
privatization of norm-creation and legal–political decision-making. 
For law, to be sure, there is much at stake, as this multidisciplinary diagnosis 
strongly suggests lawyers’ need to rethink the proper foundations, boundaries 
and—in fact—the nature of their object itself. The rich accounts of legal 
pluralism and non-state-based norm-creation, which are central to current 
depictions of the shift “from government to governance,” can be read as strong 
signals that law itself has an identity crisis, a crisis regarding its own nature and 
function. It is important to note, however, that accounts of a co-existence of 
legal and non-legal forms of social regulation, while proliferating under the 
impression of reduced state capacity to effectively regulate transnational issues, 
have always been part of the central make-up of legal theory. Early 
anthropological and legal theoretical accounts of the extensive efficacy of 
“informal” orders should have alerted lawyers a long time ago to the tension 
between law and non-law, which arguably lies at the heart of any legal system. 
This article suggests a revisiting of the field of lex mercatoria, the body of 
norms associated with a transnational “law merchant.” These norms and their 
surrounding institutions and processes, although much contested, have forever 
assumed a prominent place in studies of private ordering, driven particularly by 
the fact that the lex mercatoria reaches far, far back into past centuries of 
economic globalization, and is thus seen as testifying to both the reality and the 
viability of transnational law “beyond the state.”4 In light of the concerns raised 
 
60–103 (2000) (Ger.) (arguing for a methodological shift in legal theory to account for the integration of 
uncertainty into legal reasoning). 
 3.  See generally Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 201–53 
(1937) (describing the significance of private norm-creation); FERDINAND KIRCHHOF, PRIVATE 
RECHTSETZUNG (1987) (presenting an overview of private norm-setting in the German legal context). 
 4.  See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 447, 447–68 (2007); EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 35–66 (2010) (arguing emphatically for the existence of an “autonomous arbitral legal 
order”). 
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by lawyers regarding the limits of law and legal norm-creation in the context of 
globalization, the pressing question concerning the lex mercatoria appears to be 
that of the possibility of an autonomous legal order, that is, of a functioning 
legal system, which is itself not grounded in the nation-state’s institutionalized 
norm-creation processes.5 It is against this background of the still contested 
consequences of globalization for law that it becomes clear how much of the 
debate around the lex mercatoria, and around the autonomy and scope of this 
transnational law merchant, is ill-directed and of little analytical value. In fact, 
much of the polemics that surround the “legal” nature of the lex mercatoria, its 
“true” independence, and its autonomy from the nation-state,6 prevent us from 
turning our attention to something arguably much more important, namely why 
we should even care so much about all this.7 
What follows here should not be read as a continuation of or yet another 
contribution to what has grown into a highly differentiated and detailed debate 
about the legal quality of the lex mercatoria.8 Instead, the task here is to 
position the lex mercatoria—once again9—in the context of a still inconclusive 
investigation into the consequences of globalization for law.10 From this 
perspective, our interest in the lex mercatoria is driven by a more general 
concern with the nature and the politics of law and legal norm-creation in the 
“post-national” constellation.11 Thus, the much disputed connection between 
 
 5.  For a distinction between “traditionalists” and “transnationalists,” see KLAUS PETER 
BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2d ed. 2010).  
 6.  See generally Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, 5 OXFORD U. 
COMP. L. F. (2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml; Hans-Joachim Mertens, Lex 
Mercatoria: A Self-applying System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 31, 
31–43 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
 7.  But see Karsten Schmidt, Lex mercatoria: Allheilmittel? Rätsel? Chimäre?, in 
GLOBALISIERUNG UND RECHT: BEITRÄGE JAPANS UND DEUTSCHLANDS ZU EINER 
INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSORDNUNG IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT 153, 162–63 (Junichi Murakami, Hans-
Peter Marutschke & Karl Riesenhuber eds., 2007) (highlighting the deficiencies of the lex mercatoria in 
comparison to codified legal rules); Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex 
Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 
169–90 (Summer 2008) (revisiting two of the lex mercatoria’s founding figures, Clive Schmitthoff and 
Berthold Goldman, who espoused the idea of a unique regulatory framework for transnational 
commerce). 
 8.  See Thomas Schultz, Some Critical Comments on the Juridicity of Lex Mercatoria, in 10 Y.B. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 667, 667–710 (Andrea Bonomi & Paul Volken eds., 2008); see also the provocative 
study by GAILLARD, supra note 4, at 35–51. 
 9.  See generally Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and 
Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L. J. 400, 400–32 (2002), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 464–96 (Econ. Approaches to Law 21, Orley C. 
Ashenfelter & Radha K. Iyengar eds., 2009). 
 10.  See, e.g., Marc Amstutz, Zwischenwelten: Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechtsmethodik im 
europäischen Privatrecht, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT. RECHT-FERTIGUNG ZWISCHEN 
PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE 213–37 (Christian Joerges & Gunther 
Teubner eds., 2003); Marc Amstutz, The Letter of the Law: Legal Reasoning in a Societal Perspective, 10 
GERMAN L.J. 361, 361–82 (2009); Marc Amstutz, Métissage. Zur Rechtsform in der Weltgesellschaft, in 
EUROPÄISCHE GESELLSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG: ZUR KONSTITUTIONALISIERUNG SOZIALER 
DEMOKRATIE IN EUROPA 333–51 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano et al. eds., 2009). 
 11.  See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION. POLITICAL 
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the multidisciplinary study of globalization and legal theory merits further 
attention.12 Part of this inquiry includes connecting concerns within the legal 
discourse with concurring investigations by other disciplines into the changed 
role of the state.13 Under the impression of a forcefully emerging sociological 
discourse around the specific quality of a “world knowledge society,” a 
particular task lies in critically revisiting some of the long-standing theoretical 
categories and distinctions such as that between public and private, state and 
society, and national and international.14 In the context of a knowledge society, 
distinctions, demarcations, and boundary-settings are the foremost instruments 
of creating reality through meaning. In an argumentative, discursive context, 
meaning is constructed, deconstructed, reconstructed, and reconstituted 
through language and contestation. The lex mercatoria offers a welcome 
opportunity in this context, as a closer scrutiny of the arguments made against it 
(including its legal nature and its autonomous status) as well as in its defense, 
promises insights into the constitutive functions of such arguments. An analysis 
of the arguments made against and in favor of the lex mercatoria should allow 
us to better ascertain the construction of the societal spheres of action as well as 
of the legal spaces associated with and constituted by such arguments. 
Characterizing the lex mercatoria as “private law,” then, has particular 
connotations and consequences for its overall situation in a legal–regulatory 
context. The connotations of the qualification “private” need to be unfolded to 
better understand the place and function of this body of norms in a larger 
framework of legal (and, arguably, political) ordering. In particular, because a 
legal theory of globalization is still outstanding, it is necessary to critically 
analyze and contextualize those concepts that, for better or for worse, are relied 
upon in the process of applying established legal frameworks within the 
transnational realm.15 A concluding section of this article will sketch the outline 
of a sociologically informed method of legal thought under the heading of 
“transnational legal pluralism.” On the one hand, such an approach might offer 
some insights into the larger connotations of categories applied to the lex 
mercatoria, such as public and private or law and non-law. On the other hand, 
transnational legal pluralism might facilitate a better understanding of the 
nature of law in the continuously unfolding context of globalization.16 
 
ESSAYS (Max Pensky ed. & trans., 2001). 
 12.  See infra Part II. For an analysis from the perspectives of criminal and public law, see Ulrich 
Sieber, Rechtliche Ordnung in einer Globalen Welt, 41 RECHTSTHEORIE 151, 151–98 (2010) (Ger.). 
 13.  Saskia Sassen, Globalization or Denationalization? 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1, 1–22 (2003) 
(emphasizing the state’s agency in globalization processes); Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law, and 
Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357, 357–79 (1992) (highlighting the co-
existence and interpenetration of hard and soft norms in governance). 
 14.  See generally KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, NEGATIVE FREIHEITSRECHTE UND 
GESELLSCHAFTLICHE SELBSTORGANISATION (2000); HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE: 
GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 34 et. seq. (2007); NICO STEHR, KNOWLEDGE 
SOCIETIES (1994). 
 15.  See infra Part III. 
 16.  See infra Part IV. 
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II 
LAW AND GLOBALIZATION: VICTIM, COLLATERAL DAMAGE, OR MOTOR? 
It is striking that the formula “law and globalization” contains not one, not 
two, but altogether at least three unknowns. First, it is undisputed that 
notwithstanding numerous, often quite fruitful definitions of globalization, the 
term still operates as a conundrum, as a term depicting an analytical and 
conceptual framework grounded in several disciplines and discourses at once, 
and as such resists a clear definition. And yet, against the background of the 
continuously growing literature around the concept, emerging from a host of 
different disciplinary starting points and perspectives,17 our interest shall here be 
focused in particular on law and legal categories. From that perspective, 
however, a second unknown comes into view in a prominent way, namely the 
relationship between globalization and law. For the law, the advent of 
globalization, arguably, raises questions of existential significance. In other 
words, under the spectre of globalization, law is faced with the prospect of its 
own demise,18 most definitely due to the modern association of law with the 
state, a state that in the present era of globalization has come under great 
pressure. This association results in the making of an argument de maiore ad 
minus, whereby the perceivably dramatic impact of globalization processes on 
the state is seen to directly predetermine the transformation of law, itself 
resulting in nothing less than a far-reaching weakening, if not implosion, of 
law.19 Law, put in relation to globalization, is then portrayed as a unified body 
“under attack,” a body of norms, institutions, and processes in need of either 
being protected against or adapted to the pressures of globalization. 
Much suggests, however, that the formula holds a third, regularly neglected 
unknown. With a view to the long-standing sociological insights into the parallel 
worlds of legal and non-legal forms of social regulation, of formal and informal 
systems of legal ordering, there are good reasons to read the present iterations 
concerning the significance of globalization processes as illustrative of a new 
phase of legal evolution. This would characterize law itself as an object of 
investigation and scrutiny.20 Such scrutiny would have to rescue law from two 
 
 17.  See the brilliant exposition by David Held & Anthony McGrew, The Great Globalization 
Debate: An Introduction, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 1, 1–50 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2d ed. 2003); another very 
helpful introduction is offered by MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION. A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2009). 
 18.  An impressive testament from the point of view of a state-based theory of law is provided in 
the monographical study by STEPHAN HOBE, DER OFFENE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT ZWISCHEN 
SOUVERÄNITÄT UND INTERDEPENDENZ. EINE STUDIE ZUR WANDLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN 
STAATSBEGRIFFS DER DEUTSCHSPRACHIGEN STAATSLEHRE IM KONTEXT INTERNATIONALER 
INSTITUTIONALISIERTER KOOPERATION (1998). 
 19.  See generally UDO DI FABIO, DER VERFASSUNGSSTAAT IN DER WELTGESELLSCHAFT 
(2001); Udo Di Fabio, The Present and Future Meaning of the State and the Role of the Federal 
Constitutional Court—Interview, 2 GERMAN L.J. 20 (2001), available at http://www.germanlawjournal. 
com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=20.  
 20.  See Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy, 
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dominant claims regarding law’s fate in an era of globalization. One view insists 
on emphasizing and lamenting the alleged weakness of (the state’s) regulatory 
law that finds its most persuasive illustration in the triumphant proliferation of 
private norm-setting21 and suggests that law cannot escape death by suffocation 
in the oxygen-free atmosphere of globalization. The competing view presents a 
radicalized version of the first: it holds up an idealized image of the nation-state 
and its legal order as unified, hierarchical, and coherent—only to suffer from 
the undermining and corrosive effects of globalization. From this perspective, 
globalization is depicted as a process that emerges in (a particular) time and 
from outside the nation-state to destroy the state-based legal order.22 Such 
depictions of law “as it lay dying” suggest, above all, that law would enjoy 
blissful health and strength if only it had been protected from globalization. 
What happened? 
The remainder of this article will seek to unfold the following three working 
hypotheses: 
1. Law as an unknown must be understood and reconstructed in the context of 
globalization. 
2. Law, as thought of in conjunction with the nation-state, must today be understood 
as law after the welfare state, but not as law without the state. 
3. The question regarding the future of law in a context of globalization is one of legal 
methodology. 
As suggested, the lex mercatoria—depicted by some as a shining example 
and proof of the existence of an “autonomous arbitral legal order”23 and by 
others as whipping boy for legal theories that cling to the irresolvable nexus 
between law and the state24—shall offer an anchor point for a closer analysis 
and discussion of the three hypotheses. 
III 
THE TREACHEROUSLY “PRIVATE” NATURE OF  
AUTONOMOUS LEGAL ORDERS 
A.  Lex Mercatoria: “Intervention” Versus “Autonomy” 
In the context of international commercial arbitration, references to the lex 
mercatoria regularly target the rules and conflict resolution mechanisms of 
border-crossing commercial transactions. Emphasis is placed on flexibility, 
relevance, and discretion as the main characteristics of a system of arbitral 
tribunals that has been initiated and constituted by the commercial partners 
 
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 763, 763–88 (1997). 
 21.  See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Businesses Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. COMP. L. 901, 
901–22 (2003); see generally A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003). 
 22.  See the discussion of this description by Vesting, supra note 2.  
 23.  See, e.g., GAILLARD, supra note 4. 
 24.  See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 6. 
08_ZUMBANSEN_BP_CORRECTIONS8_29 (DO NOT DELETE) 8/29/2013  3:10 PM 
No. 2 2013] TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 123 
themselves.25 This classification hints at a number of significant differences 
between state- and non-state-based rules and conflict resolution institutions. 
The implied qualification of the lex mercatoria as autonomous is based, in part, 
on the argument that the contracting partners themselves bring the arbitral 
order into being,26 and in part on the thesis that these parties are themselves the 
authors of the applicable rules.27 The underlying, general implication, however, 
reaches higher: the claim that the lex mercatoria constitutes an autonomous 
legal order contains itself the argument that there can and should be privately 
constituted regulatory systems, independent from the state.28 We shall see that 
this claim, which is altogether not very different from positions taken by legal 
pluralists, is ultimately vulnerable to ideological hijacking and instrumental-
ization. 
From the perspective of a politically progressive law and society approach, 
the claim for an autonomous legal order can be read as a plea for a more 
context-sensitive and ultimately “learning” interaction between formal and 
informal norm-creating processes. Such an approach would not necessarily have 
to imply the existence of a law-less realm of societal interaction, but would still 
remember the insights from early institutional economics and legal realism, 
namely that markets never exist “as such,” but are legally constituted spheres of 
exercised power.29 At the same time, the assertion of an autonomous legal order 
in the context of embracing social norms as legitimate expressions of private 
ordering and conflict resolution among sovereign market participants implies a 
different understanding of the relationship between public and private, and 
between the state and the market. The latter position is wrapped up in an 
elaborate and far-reaching critique of judicial “interventions” into the allegedly 
consensual and arguably private dealings among market participants, a critique 
that harks back to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner v. New 
 
 25.  Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place: A 21st Century View 
of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 20–21 (Klaus Peter 
Berger ed., 2001); Dieter Schmidtchen, Lex Mercatoria und die Evolution des Rechts, in 
VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSITÄT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN 
WIRTSCHAFTSRÄUMEN 1, 21 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schäfer eds., 2002) (highlighting the fact that 
the lex mercatoria does not depend on a legislator). 
 26.  See Klaus Günther, Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als 
rechtstheoretisches Problem, in DIE ÖFFENTLICHKEIT DER VERNUNFT UND DIE VERNUNFT DER 
ÖFFENTLICHKEIT: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JÜRGEN HABERMAS 539 (Lutz Wingert & Klaus Günther eds., 
2001). 
 27.  MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (2008) (“Arbitration is a private system of adjudication. Parties who arbitrate have 
decided to resolve their disputes outside of any judicial system.”). 
 28.  See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 145–69 (1997); see also Gralf-Peter Calliess, Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law 
Guide To An Autonomous Legal System, 2 GERMAN L.J. 17 (2001), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=109. 
 29.  See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 48–50 (Transaction 
Publishers 1995) (1924); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470–94 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 8–
30 (1927). 
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York,30 itself evoking a century’s worth of ideological struggle over the place of 
courts in market regulation. In this contemporary, anti-judicial discourse, courts 
are rejected to the degree that they aspire to social engineering, social policy, 
and law making. More recently, courts are dismissed for their alleged lack of 
technical expertise, especially as regards the intricate details of modern-day 
commercial and corporate contracting usages. Hence, judges should adhere to 
the application of simple default rules and otherwise defer to the private 
autonomy of the contracting parties.31 
This last position raises the question as to how we are to think of rights as 
instruments available to market actors. Where should these rights emerge from 
if not from an encompassing legal order that results in contract and property 
rights regulating relations between members of a legal community? By contrast, 
the implied image of a (Hayekian) framework order, which holds on reserve a 
legal enforcement system for the occasion that private ordering fails, continues 
to rest on the assumption that rights can emerge out of nowhere. The notion of 
the state and the legal system as emergency mechanisms is based on the belief 
that the legal system can be invoked only when the market interaction—
including the exercise of property rights—defaults.32 That belief stands, to be 
sure, in stark contrast to the contention that markets are legally regulated 
spheres. The surprising emergence of rights in a professedly self-regulatory 
system described as a natural and private order is part of an argument that 
wants it all. A quasi-natural sphere of uninhibited societal interaction, disturbed 
only in cases of emergency (of which kind, we may ask) when the judicial 
system is called upon to intervene, remains a strangely impossible beast. But it 
is an intriguing and, as implied by the discourse around the autonomous nature 
of the lex mercatoria, a highly suggestive one. 
The distinction between law and non-law, which emerges in the context of 
the lex mercatoria, thus appears as directly tied to competing understandings of 
market order and “intervention.” But, as noted, the legal sociological or legal 
pluralist recognition of informal legal orders33 and of the prevalence of a vast 
number of binding commercial rules and customs34 not created by the state 
renders the opposition between progressives and conservatives ambiguous. 
Although both may emphasize the existence of norms “outside” of the state, 
they draw different conclusions from this finding for their understanding of 
legal systems as such, and this makes even the demarcation between 
 
 30.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 31.  See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 159 (2000). 
 32.  For a convincing critique, see David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in 
Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1841–58 (1996). 
 33.  See generally EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
(Walter L. Moll trans., 1936); H. W. ARTHURS, ‘WITHOUT THE LAW’: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND 
LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1985). 
 34.  An excellent summary is provided by BERGER, supra note 5. 
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progressives and conservatives considerably more difficult than in the context 
of allegedly clear ideological confrontation.35 
B.  Contract Redux 
Seen in this light, then, our interest in the lex mercatoria directs us deep into 
legal sociological accounts of “technical” (official) and “cultural” (unofficial) 
legal orders,36 while—at the same time—leading us back to legal–political 
tensions that have long characterized the evolution of law within the nation-
state. These tensions are associated with demarcations between public and 
private spaces, between state and society, and between politics and market. But, 
underneath these demarcations are conceptualizations of autonomy and 
intervention,37 individualism and altruism,38 and autonomy and care39—all of 
which point to deeper-running questions of legitimate social ordering. In other 
words, ordering paradigms such as the distinctions between public and private 
or state and society function as constituting frameworks within which questions 
of legitimacy are being addressed. 
This background goes a long way in explaining the obvious stakes in the 
debate around the lex mercatoria. The contestation of the field’s autonomous 
nature, the authorship and quality of its norms, and its adjudication mechanisms 
point to the much more contentious views regarding the competence and 
legitimacy of private actors to initiate and institutionalize a proper system of 
legal regulation. As we have seen, the conceptual embrace of a purportedly 
autonomous, transnational order may too quickly cut the ties between the 
unavoidably recurring conflicts over power, bargaining asymmetry, and third- 
party interests,40 and long-standing reflections on the relationship between state 
and society—as representations of a particular, historical constellation of public 
versus private ordering. 
This is particularly noticeable in the area of contractual governance, a field 
of societal interaction that is central to the liberal paradigm of Western law41 
and that offers the dominant ordering paradigm for the lex mercatoria. The 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45–76 (illustrating the juxtaposition of Justice Peckham’s 
embrace of a constitutionally protected free-market doctrine on the one hand and dissenting Justice 
Holmes’ insistence on the ideological indeterminacy of the constitution on the other). 
 36.  See Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 
53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 973 (2005). 
 37.  MORITZ RENNER, ZWINGENDES TRANSNATIONALES RECHT. ZUR STRUKTUR DER 
WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG JENSEITS DES STAATES 24–90 (2011). 
 38.  Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1685 (1976). 
 39.  Günter Frankenberg, Why Care?—The Trouble with Social Rights, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1365, 1371 (1996); Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 775 (1996). 
 40.  This point is emphasized by Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the 
World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
 41.  See generally FRANZ WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT UNTER 
BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG (1967); KARL RENNER, THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (O. Kahn-Freund ed., Agnes 
Schwarzschild trans., 1949). 
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forgetfulness characterizing the euphoria of many of those adhering to the 
autonomy theory of the lex mercatoria42 perpetuates itself into their theories of 
contract governance. Allegedly freed now from decades of judicial 
“interventions” into contractual bargains among sovereign private actors,43 a 
promising space of inhibited private ordering is opening, far away from conflicts 
over the social context of contracting. But because contract is so central to the 
liberal model of law, its simplified reception and conceptualization in the 
transnational context has significant consequences for the encompassing 
understanding of law’s relation to society as such. Rather than building on the 
wealth of historical,44 sociological,45 anthropological,46 economic,47 and “legal–
critical” analysis of contractual governance,48 what is received in this reading of 
the “new” transnational order is an oversimplified, stripped-down, mechanical 
concept of contracting. This reductionist reception of contract theory is guilty 
not just of ignoring the aforementioned theoretical legacies, but also of 
bypassing more recent engagements with the intricate functions of contractual 
governance in complex societal settings.49 Little, indeed, suggests that we should 
simply go back to an ideal of a “private law society,” itself determined, above 
all, by the free bargains amongst free agents.50 Considering the historically 
evolved complexity of the “embeddedness of contract,”51 such idealizations of 
 
 42.  See generally FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999). 
 43.  Robert Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 379 (2004) (“Casual 
observation thus points to the conclusion that the newly expanded contract law has failed to provide 
parties with the reliable, cost-effective rules that they prefer for enforcing and interpreting their 
agreements. Replacing common law rules with vague standards may permit courts to decide difficult 
cases, but at a substantial cost in the uncertainty of contractual obligations.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., RENNER, supra note 41. 
 45.  See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55–67 (1963). 
 46.  See, e.g., John P. Esser, Institutionalizing Industry: The Changing Forms of Contract, LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 593, 593–629 (1996); Riles, supra note 36, at 989 (arguing that her account will already 
reach beyond a sociological or anthropological one). 
 47.  See, e.g., Hale, supra note 29, at 470–94. 
 48.  See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553–92 (1932). 
 49.  As argued by a number of private law theory scholars, contract arrangements can bear the 
potential for an intricate combination of hard and soft, fixed and adaptable, “learning” elements to 
structure bi- and multi-lateral relations. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and 
Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 483–525; Esser, supra note 46, at 593–629; David Campbell, 
Reflexivity and Welfarism in the Modern Law of Contract, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 477–98 
(2000); Roy Kreitner, Frameworks of Cooperation: Competing, Conflicting, and Joined Interests in 
Contract and Its Surroundings, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59, 59–111 (2005); Peer Zumbansen, The 
Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 191–233 (2007). 
 50.  For such a plea, see generally FRANZ BYDLINSKI, DAS PRIVATRECHT IM RECHTSSYSTEM 
EINER “PRIVATRECHTSGESELLSCHAFT” (1994); for a critical response, see generally Thomas Vesting, 
Wiederkehr der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und ihres Rechts? Zur neueren Diskussion über das Verhältnis 
von öffentlichem Recht und Privatrecht, in BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 1896–1996. 
RINGVORLESUNG DER JURISTISCHEN FAKULTÄT AUGSBURG (Hans Schlosser ed., 1997). 
 51.  See generally Franz Böhm, Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft, 17 ORDO: JAHRBUCH 
FÜR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [ORDO] 75, 75–151 (1996) (Ger.) 
(arguing for a concept of connected political and economic autonomy in the tradition of the economic 
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the market as a naturally evolving sphere carry a particularly provocative scent. 
Central to the reductionist model of contractual governance is the emphasis on 
governing contracts, or “governance through contract,” as key instrument of 
private ordering relations;52 the blind spot of this bias is the practice, within the 
judiciary and in theory, of “governance of contracts.” The latter expresses itself, 
on the one hand, through the legal embeddedness of contracts in judicial 
materialization processes,53 and through the function of contract in an 
embedding political and societal economy, on the other.54 The plea for an 
autonomous transnational legal order thus seems part of an exaggerated 
demarcation of the transnational space from that of the nation-state55 and 
results in a wholesale rejection of the learning experiences that have been made 
over time within the complex relationship between state and society, public and 
private, and law and non-law. Another consequence of the simplification of 
contract is, as we have seen, an endorsement of an oversimplified idea of 
markets, which itself results in problematic assessments of the nature and the 
causes of “crisis.”56 Even today, in the sobering presence of unmanageable 
private (and public) debt, brought about in a frenzy of financial liberalization 
and credit taking, the skepticism vis-à-vis the “interventionist” state looms 
large,57 and even development discourses still appear to be endorsing a simple 
world view of socially and politically de-contextualized concepts of contractual 
freedom and property rights.58 Such an unbroken belief in the self-regulatory 
 
school of ordo-liberalism); Rudolf Wiethölter, Privatrecht als Gesellschaftstheorie?, in 
FUNKTIONSWANDEL DER PRIVATRECHTSINSTITUTIONEN. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR LUDWIG RAISER ZUM 
70. GEBURTSTAG (Fritz Baur et al. eds., 1974). For a critique of this position within corporate law, see 
Peer Zumbansen, Rethinking the Nature of the Firm: The Corporation as a Governance Object, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1469, 1469–98 (2012).  
 52.  Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 814, 820 (2006). 
 53.  See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in 
der Kollision unverträglicher Handlungslogiken (BVerfGE 89, 214 ff.), 83 KRITISCHE 
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [KRITV] 388, 388–404 
(2000) (Ger.) (highlighting the challenges of a court’s regulatory intervention into social relations that 
are not governed by a single set of rationalities); but cf., Uwe Diederichsen, Die Selbstbehauptung des 
Privatrechts gegenüber dem Grundgesetz,  JURA 57, 57–64 (1997).  
 54.  See generally Peer Zumbansen, Introduction: Private Ordering in a Globalizing World: Still 
Searching for the Basis of Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 181, 181–90 (2007). 
 55.  With certain sympathies for this perspective, see Berger, supra note 25. 
 56.  See David Campbell, The End of Posnerian Law and Economics, 73 MOD. L. REV. 305, 312 
(2010); see generally Simon Deakin, Social Rights in a Globalized Economy, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS 
HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 25–60 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); LUDWIG RAISER, DIE ZUKUNFT DES 
PRIVATRECHTS (1971). 
 57.  See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960), whose work has 
returned to new prominence in the context of the allegedly passing financial and economic crisis of our 
time; Hayek is being rediscovered as spokesperson against the paternalistic tendencies of the 
interventionist state. See Francis Fukuyama, Big-Government Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2012, at 
BR12 (book review). The economist F.A. Hayek believed that no government could know enough to 
plan for society. 
 58.  See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement 
in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1517–80 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal 
Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 1–11 (1998). 
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abilities of market actors forgoes the opportunity to learn from the critical–
historical evidence regarding legally constituted markets. In their place, we find 
social norms.59 
But rather than reconnecting the proliferation of private ordering—which 
undoubtedly is occurring inside and outside of the nation-state—with the 
already available and highly effective legal–sociological and normative 
critique,60 simplified renderings of transnational private ordering are offered. 
Lost are the insights into the recurring challenges of demarcating between 
public and private spaces of societal interaction and the “stakes” of such 
demarcations.61 The overwhelming challenges resulting from an emerging 
transnational legal, economic, and political order62 make the need to translate 
and to rethink national, historical learning experiences quite urgent. 
A mediating, bridging perspective might be forthcoming through attempts at 
further scrutinizing the “public” dimensions of transnational private ordering63 
that themselves bear important parallels with concurring efforts among public 
(international) lawyers to more concretely identify the public nature of 
international governance.64 Another promising opportunity might lie in a 
distinctly multi- and interdisciplinary analysis,65 above all, of the function of 
evolving rules, norms, and standards that have increasingly been taking the 
place of formal laws66 in the context of an irreversible shift from government to 
governance. Rather than trying to reattach these evolving regulatory forms to 
the (nation) state or to qualify them as examples of “private” ordering regimes, 
 
 59.  See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 338–433 (1997) (emphasizing the significance of norms established by interacting 
market participants); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual 
Commitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175, 191–92 (Claude Ménard & 
Mary Shirley eds., 2005). 
 60.  See the excellent analysis by Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
499, 499–554 (2006), as well as the scathing critique of the neoliberal embrace of social norms by 
Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 1–74 (2006). 
 61.  See A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in 
International Law, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 261, 262 (1997); a monographical treatment is provided by 
CUTLER, supra note 21; see also the commentary by Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: 
Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 197, 197–211 
(2004). 
 62.  See, e.g., NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF 
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010); PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (2012). 
 63.  See RENNER, supra note 37, at 73 et seq., 87 et seq. (arguing that commercial arbitration has 
increasingly been freed from control through the state and public interests). 
 64.  See Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of 
Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 GERMAN 
L.J. 1375, 1375–76 (2008). 
 65.  See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Elinor 
Ostrom, Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of Institutional 
Analysis, 3 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 239, 240 et seq. (2007). 
 66.  See generally Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation, 18 
GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 611, 611–32 (2005) (focusing on the 
regulatory function performed by accounting standards). 
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a particular focus on the different functional forms and dynamics of 
transnational governance appears to be more adequate, be they public or 
private, hard or soft, or official or unofficial.67 
IV 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL THEORY AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
A.  Normative Conflicts in World Society 
One of the crucial lessons learned from the legal realist attack on formalism 
at the outset of the twentieth century was the emphasis on a critical engagement 
with functionalism. Rather than embracing a functionalist perspective on legal 
regulation in a wholesale turn against legal formalism dressed up as historically 
evolved, technical, and value neutral, the legal realists maintained a critical 
distance from the unavoidable ideological underpinnings of “scientific” and 
expert knowledge in the context of legal interpretation.68 It is this distance that 
requires our new attention in the context of engaging with different phenomena 
of transnational private regulatory governance of which the lex mercatoria is 
but one illustration.69 Compared to some of the aforementioned examples of 
transnational economic governance, the case of the lex mercatoria might not 
appear on its face as among the most obvious instances of legal–political 
critique. And yet, a closer scrutiny of the debate around this field is clearly 
warranted in light of at least two considerations. One consideration is that the 
lex mercatoria remains an arena that has seen conflicts between some of the 
furthest-reaching theoretical and normative assertions as regards the scope and 
nature of the institutions and processes that constitute this field.70 Another 
consideration concerns the wide scope of transnational economic governance 
constellations that are captured under the lens of the lex mercatoria, not least 
testified to by the staggering increase in cases brought before this system’s 
quintessential institutional forum, the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris.71 The field is further deserving of our attention because of the way in 
which disputes over the system’s merits have largely led to a primacy of a 
weighing of advantages (efficiency, discretion, costs) over an inquiry into the 
legal nature of the norms being invoked before transnational commercial 
arbitration tribunals. The impressive reality of this functioning of the system of 
 
 67.  See Colin Scott, Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism, (Eur. Univ. 
Inst. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper RSCAS 2010/07, 2010); Peer 
Zumbansen, Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 
83, 83–96 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). 
 68.  See generally Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Method, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 809–49 (1935); JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 69.  See Symposium, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Regimes, Dialogue, 
Constitutionalization, 13 GER. L. J. 1269 (2012). 
 70.  For a fitting capture, see Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational 
Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627, 637 (2006) (“The rise of the new Lex Mercatoria raises deep 
questions about the nature of law, and about the relationship of law to state power.”). 
 71.  Id. at 636. 
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the lex mercatoria feeds the enthusiasm of those who have long been arguing 
not only in support of the merits, but also of the purported autonomy of the lex 
mercatoria.72 
One way, then, to disturb this elusive harmony would be to create tighter 
links between context analysis and the political arguments made in support of 
self-regulation and private autonomy. In that vein, the task would consist of 
searching for parallels between the particular regulatory and transactional 
context in which this turn to “private justice” is occurring73 on the one hand, and 
the calls for a de-judicialization of economic conflict resolution as they can be 
recorded within national debates about the roles of court,74 about the political 
ambiguities of access to justice guarantees,75 and about the state in economic 
governance on the other. As alluded to at the beginning of this article, such a 
comparison between national and global discourses will likely show 
considerable parallels between an allegedly global, post-national context in 
which autonomous commercial parties take refuge to a comparably more 
“efficient,” issue-oriented and discrete dispute resolution system on the one 
hand, and a national one, in which the complex economic nature of the 
commercial transaction before a court is being used as a justification to 
delegitimize undesired judicial “interventions,” on the other. 
The resulting task at this point is to bring together the observations 
regarding the contestation sites in international economic law, the contribution 
of global constitutionalism, and the critique of the hermeneutic justification 
strategies in the lex mercatoria on both the national and the global level. What 
emerges through a reading together of these three discourses is a confirmation 
that we are faced with a fundamental disembeddedness of law’s institutional 
and instrumental response mechanisms’ relation to social “problems” of a 
nature commonly associated with case law in the vein of Lochner. In fact, all 
three discourses give ample testimony to the precarious nature of law and legal 
regulation vis-à-vis (world) societal regulatory challenges. The question then 
becomes how to conceive of law in this situation as both a distinct discourse and 
as one among other societal rationalities. Clearly both the theoretical work 
around global constitutionalism and the lex mercatoria suggest that the 
boundaries of law have become porous: much of what (comparative and) global 
constitutionalists are concerned with touches on the boundaries of law and non-
law, law and politics, and law and morality. The challenge for global 
 
 72.  See generally GAILLARD, supra note 4; BERGER, supra note 5. 
 73.  P.H. Lindblom, The Privatization of Justice: Some Aspects of Recent Developments in 
American and Swedish Procedural Law, 39 NETH. INT’L L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE S1) 199, 199–214 
(1992) (describing, from a comparative perspective, the transformation of the judiciary in the aftermath 
of the Cold War). 
 74.  See, e.g., WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, MODERNISIERUNG VON RECHT UND JUSTIZ. EINE 
HERAUSFORDERUNG DES GEWÄHRLEISTUNGSSTAATES (2001) (offering a comprehensive analysis of 
the increasing shift of the German judicial system to alternative forms of conflict resolution and 
mediation). 
 75.  See generally HÉCTOR FIX-FIERRO, COURTS, JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY: A SOCIO-LEGAL 
STUDY OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY IN ADJUDICATION (2004). 
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constitutionalists is to imagine constitutionalism in very diverse settings, 
marked by different evolutionary stages of statehood, formal order, and 
informal order.76 Meanwhile, lex mercatoria scholars are asked to conceptualize 
a legal methodology that captures the intricate intersections and overlaps 
between public and private rule-setting processes and adjudication institutions. 
Finally, the dilemmas that arise in international economic law cut straight across 
these constellations as they illustrate the manifold challenges of crafting legal 
responses to border-crossing, self-regulatory activities, which are—as in the 
exemplary cases of investment law and mining—at the same time heavily 
marked by a conflict between private rights and public policy, between what 
David Schneiderman referred to as instantiations of a tension between “new 
constitutionalism” and governmental regulatory prerogatives.77 
A striking impression from a parallel observation of global 
constitutionalism, the lex mercatoria, and international economic law is how 
these sites of legal–political conflict illustrate together a number of challenges 
to law that have long marked legal regulation in the Western evolution of rule 
of law to social state on to the ambivalent constellation that has emerged from 
the decline of the welfare state. As noted earlier, the tension between formal 
and informal orders, between the state’s assumption of formulating overarching 
policies and the resulting tensions from conflicts with competing societal 
rationalities such as economics, religion, or science are not distinct for the 
current constellation of world society. They have, instead, marked the evolution 
of Western nation-states for a long time. But world society today exposes the 
fragility of the overall frameworks, which find expression in references to 
constitutionalism and market regulation. These frameworks, recently still 
associated with the evolution of a particular, often nationally institutionalized 
constitutional order and relatively recognizable frontiers between competing 
conceptions of “state” and “market,”78 are today no longer available except with 
references to particular historically and locally conceived evolutionary 
narratives. In contrast, the world societal setting opens up a vista on endless 
confrontations and conflicts between different interest formations, rationalities, 
and stakes. It is against this background that the three legal discourses we 
identified illustrate the trials of law’s attempts to adapt to these changing 
conditions. 
In other words, these three constellations prompt a reconsideration of legal 
methodology in light of the profound loosening of the state-law nexus in a 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Ulrich Sieber, Legal Order in a Global World. The Development of a Fragmented 
System of National, International, and Private Norms, in 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 1, 
1–49 (2010).  
 77.  David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY, 757, 758 (2000) (“The new constitutionalism refers to the quasi-legal restructuring of the state 
and the institutionalization of international political forms that emphasize market credibility and 
efficiency and also limit the processes of democratic decision making within nation states.”). 
 78.  Compare generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944), with FRIEDRICH 
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) and HAYEK, supra note 57.  
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global context. In the 1950s Philip Jessup suggested the term “transnational 
law” to identify a legal response to those border-crossing activities which were 
not adequately captured by either conflict of laws (private international law) or 
public international law.79 Arguably, already for Jessup, transnational law could 
be conceived of as a label for a legal “field,” as much as a conceptual framework 
within which to investigate the arguments used to demarcate “national” and 
“transnational” spheres of legal regulation. Today, with the context of such 
investigations having changed considerably, the juxtaposition of territorially 
confined and global spaces is just one among others through which we try to 
make sense of the complex world societal relations with regard to which we re-
ascertain the nature and the role of law. 
As a result, a concept of transnational law must embrace this constellation 
in the hope of offering a methodology in response to it. In this process, 
transnational law might become but a short-hand for a methodological inquiry 
into the nature of law in a global context.80 Namely, from a methodological 
perspective, the tensions between national and global, between public and 
private, and between law and non-law can be understood as constitutive 
elements of an emerging understanding of the law of world society. These 
tensions are constitutive and inherent to world society law, because they 
illustrate the unavoidable ambivalence—politically, culturally, and morally—of 
competing and colliding ordering paradigms, alongside of which law seeks to 
express and assert itself. And it is from a methodological perspective that 
individual areas of law can be understood as a showcase of the struggle for law81 
in the context of a radically changed institutional and regulatory landscape.82 
Transnational law, understood as a legal–theoretical, legal–methodological 
approach, prompts us to study the emergence of hybrid, unruly, and messy 
regulatory regimes as instantiations of an evolving legal rationality in the 
context of world society. In other words, transnational law scrutinizes the 
nature of the distinction between law and non-law, which it understands as an 
expression of its own need to define its relation to society. In this vein, 
transnational law cannot remain confined to a study of only legal theory, legal 
doctrine, or legal history. Instead, the nature and role of law in world society 
must be ascertained through a multi- and interdisciplinary investigation into the 
forms and dynamics of societal regulation. 
 
 79.  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). See generally Christian Tietje & Karsten 
Nowrot, Laying Conceptual Ghosts of the Past to Rest: The Rise of Philip C. Jessup’s ‘Transnational 
Law’ in the Regulatory Governance of the International Economic System, 50 BEITRÄGE ZUM 
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ESSAYS IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW] 17, 17–43 
(2006). 
 80.  For background, see generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898, 898–925 (Jan Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012); Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 141, 141–89 (2010) [hereinafter 
Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism]. 
 81.  RUDOLF VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 21 (J. Lalor trans., 2d ed. 1915). 
 82.  Sweet, supra note 70, at 637. 
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B.  The Promise of Legal Pluralism 
Such an investigation must draw on extensive empirical and ethnographic 
studies, as has long been standard in legal anthropological research. Through 
such an approach, the formation of norm-setting processes becomes visible 
from within highly specialized and localized contexts. From a legal 
anthropological perspective, the attribution of such processes and institutions to 
either a “national” or “global” level is of less significance than the illumination 
of the concrete context out of which norms are being formed and 
institutionalized. Legal pluralists, by drawing on anthropological and 
sociological accounts to more adequately capture the dynamics of norm-
creation and regulatory practice, scrutinize the distinction between a legal and a 
social norm to better understand the concrete process through which a norm 
comes into existence and is adhered to or rejected. The distinction between law 
and non-law, then, doesn’t serve as a yardstick to differentiate between a 
“valid” or “invalid” norm, between binding or non-binding, but as one which 
can explain the discursive context in which such qualities are being ascribed to 
either. As such, a view that radically relativizes an otherwise accepted 
connection between valid legal norms and a particular institutional framework 
to generate such norms,83 which are of interest mostly from a historiographical 
perspective,84 holds great promise for a study of norm-generating processes in 
the global context. Rather than demarcating between formal and informal, 
legitimate and illegitimate sources of law, global or transnational legal pluralist 
approaches85 start from the concrete context “on the ground.” Through this 
lens, the discursive constructions of the meaning of formal and informal, 
legitimate and illegitimate, and public and private become discernible. As such, 
it becomes possible to explain the emergence of particular connotations and 
attributions against the background of specific historical, evolutionary patterns, 
but such an inquiry does not answer the question how to distinguish between 
law and non-law in a categorical way. Instead, the legal pluralist and legal 
anthropological approaches help us understand the circumstances and 
influences that contribute to the characterization of a norm in this way or 
another.86 Transnational “law” can thus be reconceived as transnational legal 
pluralism in that it methodologically responds to the fragmented, disembedded 
evolutionary dynamics of norm-creation in the context of world society. 
 
 83.  See generally ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 
(1971). 
 84.  See Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft, 9 RECHTSHISTORISCHES 
JOURNAL 176, 176–220 (1990) (Ger.) (tracing the emergence of constitutional norms as part of the 
differentiation and consolidation of political systems). 
 85.  See the conceptual proposals by BERMAN, supra note 62; Ralf Michaels, Global Legal 
Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 243–62 (2009); Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 
supra note 80, at 167. 
 86.  See generally ARTHURS, supra note 33. 
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C.  The Elusive Status of the Political in World Society 
But what about the politics? How can a transnational legal pluralist 
approach adequately respond to the conflicts we have alluded to earlier with 
reference to global constitutionalism and international economic law, and which 
are inherent to the lex mercatoria?87 An answer depends on the degree to which 
the legal anthropological or pluralist lens allows for a better understanding of 
how “interests” and “stakes” find expression. In other words, the “deliverable” 
of this approach is not seen in the formulation of a programmatic or principled 
political (normative, or critical) viewpoint. Instead, the task is to lay bare the 
processes through which views are being formulated, through which they 
become dominant or defeated, institutionalized or squashed. The fast-
proliferating anthropological investigations into deeply contested conflict zones 
such as those alluded to earlier88 give ample testimony of the significance of 
further enriching and concretizing the description of the site of conflict. It is 
only against this background that we may begin to understand the particular, 
evolving nature of “political” struggles, claims, and processes in a transnational 
context. 
Let us return now, one last time, to our example of the lex mercatoria and to 
the significant political ambiguities underneath the surface of such a fast-
evolving regulatory regime. The already depicted hiatus between national 
discourses regarding overburdened, “incompetent” courts and the transnational 
aspiration to an autonomous, self-regulatory order is an interesting tale about 
the construction of meaning and the power of polemics. In light of the proposal 
to “short-circuit” national and transnational regulatory discourses in the hope 
of thus identifying common challenges as well as insights (and blind spots), it 
appears that the hiatus depicted here results, above all, from an unwarranted 
demarcation of the two spheres when it comes to identifying their respective 
constitutive qualities. 
Arguably, the line-drawing between national and global assertions of the 
roles of courts in economic governance and market regulation results in a de-
politicization of the respective governance constellations. The turn away from 
the national as “traditional” and the turn toward the “transnational”89 in fact 
cuts the ties between a space associated with (endless90) politics and one 
strangely untouched by such quarrels. Echoing Stone Sweet’s keen observation 
of lex mercatoria’s aspirations for an a-national regulatory regime,91 we can find 
an intriguing illustration of how “denationalization”92 functions in fact as an 
 
 87.  See generally CUTLER, supra note 21. 
 88.  See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 89.  See generally BERGER, supra note 5. 
 90.  Carl Schmitt, State Ethics and the Pluralist State, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 
300, 300–12 (Arthur J. Jacobson & B. Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper et al trans., 2000) (providing a 
famous description of the challenges posed to the concept of a sovereign and unitary state by a 
pluralistic society).  
 91.  Sweet, supra note 70, at 633. 
 92.  Sassen, supra note 13, at 1–22 (offering an analysis of how state actors are facilitating processes 
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immunization of a sphere of societal interaction from political critique. Taking 
arguments of expediency and economic efficiency at face value to prioritize 
private arbitration tribunals over national courts, an entire body of experience 
with evolving judicial systems, adjudication, and conflicts over rights is being 
made irrelevant. 
Meanwhile, continuing national debates about the reform of the judicial 
system illustrate the stakes and vulnerabilities in this context. These dimensions 
of the judicial system no longer come into view in the context of the lex 
mercatoria, as the entire system is understood to be available and of service 
only to those who engage in transnational economic activity and who have 
chosen to have a possible legal conflict with their business partner(s) resolved 
through an arbitration process. Such a narrow characterization of the 
transnational arbitration system, however, understates the significance of the 
arbitral system in a larger context of private transnational economic 
governance, which is brought about by a large-scale privatization of norm-
generation, implementation, and enforcement. This in turn raises pressing 
questions regarding the “public” dimensions, responsibilities, and protections 
available to all those “affected.”93 
Opening up such a comparative perspective on national and global 
sentiments with regard to the role of courts in economic governance, we may be 
able to see striking parallels between the resistance against “incompetent” 
courts on the national level and the claim for an autonomous legal order in the 
transnational sphere. But, with these parallel insights, the blind spots and 
intentional omissions of this embrace of private justice also become visible—
inside and outside of the nation state. Questions of context, externalities, and 
stakeholders become ones that are of concern allegedly only from a policy 
perspective, which is seen as somehow external to both the conflict at hand and 
the institutional regime designed to handle it. 
This isolation of a particular conflict between two competing rights positions 
from the larger socio-economic and legal context, in which any assertion of 
rights and their scope must take place, is a well-known move in legal–political 
argument.94 The demands for a more “efficient” judicial system to handle 
economic conflicts have dramatic consequences for the opportunities of 
verbalizing and thematizing the hereby neglected and invisibilized externalities 
and affected interests. Whereas debates about court reform in the context of the 
 
of deregulation that are often associated with processes of globalization and with accounts of the state 
as a “victim” of globalization). 
 93.  RENNER, supra note 37, at 24–25; see Regina Kreide, The Ambivalence of Juridification. On 
Legitimate Governance in the International Context, 2 GLOBAL JUST.: THEORY PRAC. RHETORIC 18, 
28–29 (2009) (on the criterium of “affectedness” as a crucial element in an emerging transnational 
political–legal order); Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 
500–24 (2012) (reviewing von Daniels’ The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective and 
Calliess & Zumbansen’s Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private 
Law). 
 94.  See, e.g., Lochner v New York, 45 U.S. 198 at 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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nation state would not be possible without a consideration of the historically 
evolved role of the courts as well as of the encompassing constitutional 
framework, the claim for private justice seeks to free itself from any such 
context. As a result, the underlying challenge of conceptualizing a judicial 
system which satisfies comprehensive demands for an “access to justice”95 is 
seen as having little relevance for the merchant client-oriented system of 
transnational commercial arbitration. By isolating and underscoring the 
advantages of a streamlined, privatized, and expedient dispute resolution 
system, such calls for an autonomous arbitration order result in a more 
encompassing dismissal of a historically grown judicial culture, which has long 
been understood as an essential element of the evolution of the rule of law. An 
important dimension of this experience has for some time found expression in a 
renewed interest in questions of access, acceptance, and compliance among 
those that a judicial system is designed to serve. Such concerns are formulated 
in the context of a far-reaching frustration with the inadequate functioning of 
rule-of-law institutions96 but also in new, emerging contexts of alternative 
conflict resolution in precarious post-conflict constellations.97 
These two examples precisely underscore the importance of taking the 
larger context into view out of which norm-generating and adjudication 
processes are forming today—but out of which such processes have always been 
emerging. Rather than testifying to attempts at returning to ambitious programs 
of court-driven social engineering, the emphasis on context is motivated by the 
need for a much richer and better-informed account of a problem to be turned 
into a “case”—today as in the past. This context defies “political,” normative 
“answers.” Instead, it prompts an incessant inquiry into the different venues 
and fora through which stakes are being identified and expressed. In that 
regard, the focus shifts away from the normative focus on the content of a 
particular interest or stake to a scrutiny of the challenges in giving expression to 
all viewpoints and factors which inform and shape a particular problem. This 
observation allows us to connect the legal pluralist work, say, as it began to 
critically engage with the legal system in the Western welfare state of the 
1970s,98 with the rich anthropological and legal–sociological work that is being 
carried out today. The politics, then, are in the process of making visible the 
competing interests and viewpoints. This is the background against which we 
must henceforth look for legal responses. 
 
 95.  See, in particular, the project by Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The 
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective. A General Report, in 1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD 
SURVEY 3, 3–124 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978). 
 96.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 150 (1974). 
 97.  See generally the contributions in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriazza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). 
 98.  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous 
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1 (1981). 
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In other words, the legal pluralist’s focus on context complements the 
discursive analysis, which we have identified as being crucial to lay bare the 
otherwise hidden political assumptions of the calls for an autonomous 
transnational legal order. A central concern of such scrutiny must be to 
question readily found demarcations between “economic” and “other” issues or 
interests, as they inform many of the arguments made against judicial 
“incompetence” and “intervention.”99 There are several fundamental problems 
with assertions such as these. A demarcation of economic and non-economic 
issues, the latter of which Gillian Hadfield labels “justice,” risks missing the 
complexity of just about any “economic” problem.100 This would be true now as 
it was a long time ago.101 
To the degree that the legal depiction of a particular social situation or 
“problem” is always the result of an “alienation” and complex form of 
translation of the social facts—by way of identification and construction of a 
specific constellation of interests102—into the rationality of the law, this process 
itself must be accounted for in legal methodology. We thus need to take 
seriously that any legal appropriation of a social conflict is always already 
impregnated by a number of competing societal rationalities (such as 
economics, politics, and religion), which enrich, complement, but also disturb 
the legal account. The necessity to lay bare the way in which such different 
elements find their way into the legal depiction of a problem had long been 
identified by a sociological and pluralist legal theory when asking what lies 
“behind a case.” 
The coalescence of a widespread disillusionment with the promises of “free 
markets,”103 the significant insights from the “law and development” 
movement,104 along with a powerful, anthropologically informed human rights 
critique105 illustrates the promises of a legal theory that places a distinct 
 
 99.  Gillian K. Hadfield, The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global 
Transactions, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND 
THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 239, 
241–255 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009). For a critical rebuttal, see GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER 
ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE 
LAW 27–152 (2010). 
 100.  See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 65, at 239–64. 
 101.  See Cohen, supra note 29, at 8–30; Cohen, supra note 48, at 553–92. 
 102.  See generally Teubner, supra note 53, at 388–404; Gunther Teubner & Peer Zumbansen, 
Rechtsentfremdungen: Zum gesellschaftlichen Mehrwert des zwölften Kamels, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 189, 189–215 (2000) (Ger.) (outlining a theory of law’s appropriation of a social 
conflict and its transposition into a justiciable “case”). 
 103.  For a critique, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
(2002). 
 104.  See generally David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law 
and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 1–50 (1972); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 
WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1062–1101. 
 105.  See Richard Ashby Wilson, Tyrannosaurus Lex: The Anthropology of Human Rights and 
Transnational Law, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL 
AND THE LOCAL 342, 342–69 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007); Sally Engle Merry, New 
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emphasis on a close study of the particular dynamics of societal norm-creation 
and conflict resolution. The lex mercatoria of the future still has to take that 
methodological step rather than stay confined to a world view shaped by 
distinctions between economic and non-economic or national and global. Only 
by reorienting its analytical focus toward the diverse contexts of legal conflict 
constellations will it be possible to unearth the liens between a “transnational 
legal theory” so desired by the promoters of the lex mercatoria,106 and the 
actually ongoing efforts in search of a “better” justice system—nationally, 
internationally, locally, and globally. 
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 106.  Thomas Schultz, The Concept of Law in Transnational Arbitral Legal Orders and Some of Its 
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